Commit e38e9b54 authored by Sytse Sijbrandij's avatar Sytse Sijbrandij
Browse files

Merge branch 'doc/file_read' into 'master'

Add security tips about file and paths

These are some extra guidelines to guard against code execution and path traversal.

See merge request !1317
# Guidelines for shell commands in the GitLab codebase
This document contains guidelines for working with processes and files in the GitLab codebase.
These guidelines are meant to make your code more reliable _and_ secure.
## References
- [Google Ruby Security Reviewer's Guide](
......@@ -109,3 +112,63 @@
Note that unlike `Gitlab::Popen.popen`, `IO.popen` does not capture standard error.
## Avoid user input at the start of path strings
Various methods for opening and reading files in Ruby can be used to read the
standard output of a process instead of a file. The following two commands do
roughly the same:
`touch /tmp/pawned-by-backticks`'|touch /tmp/pawned-by-file-read')
The key is to open a 'file' whose name starts with a `|`.
Affected methods include Kernel#open, File::read, File::open, IO::open and IO::read.
You can protect against this behavior of 'open' and 'read' by ensuring that an
attacker cannot control the start of the filename string you are opening. For
instance, the following is sufficient to protect against accidentally starting
a shell command with `|`:
# we assume repo_path is not controlled by the attacker (user)
path = File.join(repo_path, user_input)
# path cannot start with '|' now.
## Guard against path traversal
Path traversal is a security where the program (GitLab) tries to restrict user
access to a certain directory on disk, but the user manages to open a file
outside that directory by taking advantage of the `../` path notation.
# Suppose the user gave us a path and they are trying to trick us
user_input = '../other-repo.git/other-file'
# We look up the repo path somewhere
repo_path = 'repositories/user-repo.git'
# The intention of the code below is to open a file under repo_path, but
# because the user used '..' she can 'break out' into
# 'repositories/other-repo.git'
full_path = File.join(repo_path, user_input) do # Oops!
A good way to protect against this is to compare the full path with its
'absolute path' according to Ruby's `File.absolute_path`.
full_path = File.join(repo_path, user_input)
if full_path != File.absolute_path(full_path)
raise "Invalid path: #{full_path.inspect}"
end do # Etc.
A check like this could have avoided CVE-2013-4583.
Supports Markdown
0% or .
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment