- Aug 10, 2017
- Aug 07, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
This vulnerability was fixed by the previous patch and there were more ways to exploit than using '|shellcmd'. So it doesn't make sense to reject only pipe character. Test cases are updated to actually try to exploit the bug. As the SSH bridge of git/svn subrepos are not managed by our code, the tests for non-hg subrepos are just removed. This may be folded into the original patches.
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- Aug 05, 2017
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Jun Wu authored
This patch uses shellquote to quote ssh parameters more strictly to avoid shell injection.
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- Jul 31, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
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- Jul 28, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
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Sean Farley authored
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- Aug 01, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
Checking in the sshpeer for a rogue ssh:// urls seems like the right place to do it (instead of whack-a-mole with pull, clone, push, etc).
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- Aug 04, 2017
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Augie Fackler authored
This paranoia probably isn't required, but it can't hurt either.
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- Jul 28, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
Our use of SSH has an exploit that will parse the first part of an url blindly as a hostname. Prior to this set of security patches, a url with '-oProxyCommand' could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' can be abused to execute arbitrary commands in a similar fashion. We defend against this by checking ssh:// URLs and looking for a hostname that starts with a - or contains a |. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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- Jul 26, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
The initial attempt was to discard cache when appropriate, but it appears to be error prone. We had to carefully inspect all places where audit() is called e.g. without actually updating filesystem, before removing files and directories, etc. So, this patch disables the cache of audited paths by default, and enables it only for the following cases: - short-lived auditor objects - repo.vfs, repo.svfs, and repo.cachevfs, which are managed directories and considered sort of append-only (a file/directory would never be replaced with a symlink) There would be more cacheable vfs objects (e.g. mq.queue.opener), but I decided not to inspect all of them in this patch. We can make them cached later. Benchmark result: - using old clone of http://selenic.com/repo/linux-2.6/ (38319 files) - on tmpfs - run HGRCPATH=/dev/null hg up -q --time tip && hg up -q null - try 4 times and take the last three results original: real 7.480 secs (user 1.140+22.760 sys 0.150+1.690) real 8.010 secs (user 1.070+22.280 sys 0.170+2.120) real 7.470 secs (user 1.120+22.390 sys 0.120+1.910) clearcache (the other series): real 7.680 secs (user 1.120+23.420 sys 0.140+1.970) real 7.670 secs (user 1.110+23.620 sys 0.130+1.810) real 7.740 secs (user 1.090+23.510 sys 0.160+1.940) enable cache only for vfs and svfs (this series): real 8.730 secs (user 1.500+25.190 sys 0.260+2.260) real 8.750 secs (user 1.490+25.170 sys 0.250+2.340) real 9.010 secs (user 1.680+25.340 sys 0.280+2.540) remove cache function at all (for reference): real 9.620 secs (user 1.440+27.120 sys 0.250+2.980) real 9.420 secs (user 1.400+26.940 sys 0.320+3.130) real 9.760 secs (user 1.530+27.270 sys 0.250+2.970)
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- Aug 01, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
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- Aug 10, 2017
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Augie Fackler authored
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durin42 authored
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durin42 authored
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- Aug 07, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
This vulnerability was fixed by the previous patch and there were more ways to exploit than using '|shellcmd'. So it doesn't make sense to reject only pipe character. Test cases are updated to actually try to exploit the bug. As the SSH bridge of git/svn subrepos are not managed by our code, the tests for non-hg subrepos are just removed. This may be folded into the original patches.
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- Aug 05, 2017
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Jun Wu authored
This patch uses shellquote to quote ssh parameters more strictly to avoid shell injection.
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- Jul 31, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
'ssh://' has an exploit that will pass the url blindly to the ssh command, allowing a malicious person to have a subrepo with '-oProxyCommand' which could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' is able to execute arbitrary commands. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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Sean Farley authored
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- Jul 28, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
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Sean Farley authored
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- Aug 01, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
Checking in the sshpeer for a rogue ssh:// urls seems like the right place to do it (instead of whack-a-mole with pull, clone, push, etc).
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- Aug 04, 2017
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Augie Fackler authored
This paranoia probably isn't required, but it can't hurt either.
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- Jul 28, 2017
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Sean Farley authored
Our use of SSH has an exploit that will parse the first part of an url blindly as a hostname. Prior to this set of security patches, a url with '-oProxyCommand' could run arbitrary code on a user's machine. In addition, at least on Windows, a pipe '|' can be abused to execute arbitrary commands in a similar fashion. We defend against this by checking ssh:// URLs and looking for a hostname that starts with a - or contains a |. When this happens, let's throw a big abort into the user's face so that they can inspect what's going on.
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- Jul 26, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
The initial attempt was to discard cache when appropriate, but it appears to be error prone. We had to carefully inspect all places where audit() is called e.g. without actually updating filesystem, before removing files and directories, etc. So, this patch disables the cache of audited paths by default, and enables it only for the following cases: - short-lived auditor objects - repo.vfs, repo.svfs, and repo.cachevfs, which are managed directories and considered sort of append-only (a file/directory would never be replaced with a symlink) There would be more cacheable vfs objects (e.g. mq.queue.opener), but I decided not to inspect all of them in this patch. We can make them cached later. Benchmark result: - using old clone of http://selenic.com/repo/linux-2.6/ (38319 files) - on tmpfs - run HGRCPATH=/dev/null hg up -q --time tip && hg up -q null - try 4 times and take the last three results original: real 7.480 secs (user 1.140+22.760 sys 0.150+1.690) real 8.010 secs (user 1.070+22.280 sys 0.170+2.120) real 7.470 secs (user 1.120+22.390 sys 0.120+1.910) clearcache (the other series): real 7.680 secs (user 1.120+23.420 sys 0.140+1.970) real 7.670 secs (user 1.110+23.620 sys 0.130+1.810) real 7.740 secs (user 1.090+23.510 sys 0.160+1.940) enable cache only for vfs and svfs (this series): real 8.730 secs (user 1.500+25.190 sys 0.260+2.260) real 8.750 secs (user 1.490+25.170 sys 0.250+2.340) real 9.010 secs (user 1.680+25.340 sys 0.280+2.540) remove cache function at all (for reference): real 9.620 secs (user 1.440+27.120 sys 0.250+2.980) real 9.420 secs (user 1.400+26.940 sys 0.320+3.130) real 9.760 secs (user 1.530+27.270 sys 0.250+2.970)
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- Aug 01, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
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- Aug 10, 2017
- Aug 07, 2017
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Mathias De Mare authored
Without this flag, compilation fails with: hgclient.c: In function 'hgc_open': hgclient.c:466: error: 'O_DIRECTORY' undeclared (first use in this function) hgclient.c:466: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once hgclient.c:466: error: for each function it appears in.) Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D260
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Mathias De Mare authored
CentOS 5 has reached end-of-life. A working build for it is still possible using 'vault.centos.org'. Differential Revision: https://phab.mercurial-scm.org/D261
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- Aug 05, 2017
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Kostia Balytskyi authored
Without this patch on Windows 'hg ci -i' hangs waiting for user input and "examine changes to 'file'? [Ynesfdaq?]" is never displayed (at least if the diff is sufficiently small). When Ctrl+C is pressed, this prompt becomes visible, which suggests that the buffer just wasn't flushed. I've never seen this happening on Linux, but this looks harmless enough to not platform-gate it.
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- Aug 02, 2017
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Yuya Nishihara authored
It appears that overriding __setitem__() doesn't work as documented on PyPy. Let's patch it as before bd0fd3ff9916. https://docs.python.org/2/library/collections.html#ordereddict-examples-and-recipes The issue was ui.configitems() wasn't ordered correctly, so the pull command was wrapped in different order.
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Yuya Nishihara authored
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Yuya Nishihara authored
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Yuya Nishihara authored
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